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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
P. S. GUSS dba PHOTO S·OUND 
PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING 
c·oMPANY, 
A ppeUarnt, 
vs. 
UTAH LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD and UNITED STEEL-
WORKERS OF AMERI·CA, CIO, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 8393 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This matter comes before the ·court on a Writ of 
Review to review an order of the Utah Labor Relations 
Board ·directed against Philip S. Guss doing business 
as Photo Sound Products Manufacturing Company, a 
sole proprietorship, requiring him to reinstate certain 
ex-employees ·and to bargain collectively with United 
Steelworkers of America, CIO. The Petition for Writ 
of Review questions the jurisdiction of the Utah Labor 
Relations Board under the cir·cumstances of this case 
to issue such an order. 
P. S. Guss is a Utah resident engaged in business 
in Salt Lake City under the trade name of Photo Sound 
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Products Manufacturing Company, hereinafter referred 
to as Photo Soun·d. Photo Sound was set up by Mr. 
Guss to perform contracts for the United States Air 
Force for the design and manufacture of specialized 
photographic equipment. That is and was its only fun-c-
tion. (R. 121) The business during the period in ques-
tion involved three Air Force contracts; one for chemical 
mixers in the amount of $84,896.73, one for printers in 
the amount of $37,222.42, and one for p·rint straighteners 
in the amount of $2:9,906.35. (R .. 12·5) To perform these 
contracts for the Air Force, Photo Sound purchased 
from sources outside the st·ate, stainless steel in an 
amount "a little less than $50,000" (R.133). The finished 
products were shipped to the Air Force at Wright-Pat-
terson Field, Dayton, Ohio and other Air Force bases, 
ineluding Hill Field, Utah, and other bases outside the 
state. ( R. 124) 
Shortly after the company started op·er·ating the 
United Steelworkers of America, CIO, in December of 
1953, filed with the National Labor Relations Board, a 
petition for certification under the National Labor 
Relations Act of that union .as the bargaining representa-
tives for all of the ·employees of the company, except 
elerical and supervisory employees, as defined in the 
National Labor Relations Act, as amended. (R. 230) At 
the time for hearing on the p:etition on January 19, 
1954 (R. 176) the company and the union entered into 
an ·agreement for a consent election to he conducted by 
the National Labor Relations Board. (R. 233) Among 
other things, this agreement recited that the employer, 
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Photo Sound, was ''engaged in commerce within the 
meaning of Section 3(6) (7) of the National Labor Rela-
tion Act. '' ( R. 233, par. 8) 
The election was ~conducted by the National Board 
on April 26, 1954 and was won ~by the union, 15 to 11. 
(R. 233) Under date of May 4, 1954, the United Steel-
workers of America, CIO, were duly certified by the 
National Labor Relations Board pursuant to section 9(a) 
of the National Labor Relations Act. (R.234) 
Although no request to bargain was made by the 
union until May 6, 19'54 (R. 2'36) (and although it had 
won the election), on May 14, 1954, the union filed a 
charge against Photo Sound with the National Labor 
Relations Board ( R. 290) under sections 8 (a) ( 1), ( 3) 
and (5) of the National Labor Relations Aet, as amended, 
alleging that the company had been guilty of unfair 
labor practices, including interference with the election, 
discriminatory discharges and refusal to bargain. Also 
during this period, the union published in the May, 1954 
issue of the Utah CIO News (R. 291) a scurrilous attack 
upon Philip S. Guss and Photo Sound. Because of this 
hostile attitude of the union, Guss concluded that counsel 
should be present at all collective bargaining negotia-
tions. Such was the case in the negotiations which pro-
ceeded between the union and the company between June 
1, 1954 and the end of July of that year. 
During this same p·eriod, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board was investigating the -charges filed with it 
~by the union. In July, 1954, the National Labor Relations 
Board issued new "yardsticks" which it indicated it 
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would apply to determine whether it would, in a partic-
ular case, exercise the exclusive jurisdiction granted it by 
Congress. (NLRB Release No. R-445, July 1, 1954, and 
No. R-449, July 15, 1954). Applying this new yardstick, 
the National Board under date of July 21, 1954, ·declined 
to ·consider the matter of the charges filed by the United 
Steelworkers ·of America, CIO, against Photo Sound, 
stating: 
''Further proceedings are not warranted, in-
asmuch as the operations of the ·company involved 
are predominately local in -character and it does 
not appear that it would effectuate the policy of 
the Act to exercise jurisdictio·n. I am therefore, 
refusing to issue complaint in this matter." (R. 
235) 
The union, in ·this notice, was advised that it had the 
right to a review of this action taken by the National 
Board in declining to exercise its juris,diction, but no 
app-eal was taken by the union. (R. 18) 
On July 29, 1954, the union filed substantially the 
same 0harge with the State Board (R. 1) that it had 
p·reviously filed with the National Boar-d. No complaint 
was issued by the State Board until January 14, 1955 
and notice of hearing thereon issued the same date. 
This was the first notice either Photo Sound or its 
counsel had that the union had filed charges with the 
State Boar~d. 
At the hearing on the ·charges before the State Board 
on F·ebruary 7, 1955, the company presented its conten-
tion that the matter was not within the jurisdiction of 
the Utah Board ('R. 17) and objected to the introduc-
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tion of all evidence and other proc·eedings on the same 
grounds (R 2.0). At the elose of the union's case, the 
company renewed its motion to dismiss on the ground 
that the proceedings were not within the juris·diction 
of the State Board, but were within the exclusive juris-
diction of the National Labor Relations Board (R. 133). 
The hearing examiner ruled that the business of 
Photo Sound affected intrastate as well as interstate 
commeree (R. 317), and concluded therefrom that the 
State Board had jurisdiction. The Utah State Labor 
Relations Board affirmed the ruling of the hearing 
examiner (R. 329) and issued an ·order directing Photo 
Sound to cease and desi·st from refusing to bargain 
collectively with the CIO and directing it to take ·certain 
affirmative action with respect to eertain of its ex-em-
ployees designated in the order. This Writ of Review 
was obtained to question the jurisdiction of the Utah 
Labor Relations Board to issue such an order. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD HAS 
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR RELATIONS 
OF PHOTO SOUND PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING CO·M-
PANY. 
POINT TWO 
ACTION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD IN DECLINING TO E'XERCISE ITS JURISDICTION 
DOES NOT CONVEY JURISDICTION TO THE UTAH 
BOARD. 
A. The National Labor Relations Board has not ceded 
jurisdiction. 
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B. The refusa'l of the National Labor Relations Board 
to exercise its jurisdiction, does not create jurisdiction in the 
State Board. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BO·ARD HAS 
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR RELATIONS 
OF PHOTO SOUND PRO·DUCTS MANUFACTURING CO·M-
PANY. 
The judicial plowing of the field of fe-deral-state 
relationship in the administration of lahor relations since 
the enactment of the Wagner L-abor Relations A·ct in 
19a51 and its amendment in 191472 makes it clear that the 
National Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction in this 
matter and that such juris-diction of the National Board 
is exclusive, Congress having preempted the field, except 
for certain particular instances sp~ecifically spelled out 
in the Act. 
S·in·ce early in NLRA history the Supreme Court 
has held that Congress intended to exercise the full scope 
of its authority un,der the Commerce clause in the labor 
relations fiel~d. In NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 US 1 (1939) 
the Supreme Court held the power of Congress to reg-
ulate interstate commerce is plenary and extends to 
all such commerce, be it great or small and that; 
''The Act, on its face, thus evidences the 
intention of Congress to exercise whatever power 
is {~onstiutionally given it * * * we ·can perceive 
no basis for inferring any intention of Congress 
to make the op~eration of the Act ·depend upon 
any particular volume of commerce ·affected * • * '' 
1 29 USC § 151-166, 49 Stat. 457. 
2 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136. 
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The trial exarmner of the Utah Labor Relations 
Board, without referring to the approximately $50,000.00 
worth of purchases in interstate ·commeree of Photo 
Sound found: 
"It must be conceded that the Respondent is 
manufacturing products almost all of which are 
shipped outside the State of Utah. It is also true 
that a large amount of the dollars expended in 
performing these contracts are spent for labor 
and the purchase of materials on a local level. 
It is thus apparent, that intrastate ·commeree as 
"\Vell as interstate commerce is affected by this 
dispute." (R. 317) 
Since the Board found that interstate commerce 
as well as intrastate is affected by ·the dispute between 
Photo Sound and the CIO, it is clear that the labor rela-
tions of Photo Sound Products Manufacturing Company, 
and particularly -charges of discrimination and refusal 
to bargain, matters expressly dealt with by Section 8(a) 
(1), (3) and (5) of the National Act, are within the 
National Board's exclusive jurisdiction. Santa Cruz 
Packing Co. vs. NLRB, 303 US 453, (1938). Other cases 
holding on facts similar to those established with respect 
to Photo Sound, that the National L·abor Relations Board 
has jurisdiction and has exercised such jurisdiction, 
might be cited ad infinitum, but as the principle is so 
clear, this brief will not be unduly lengthened by such 
enumeration. In almost every ease affecting interstate 
commerce, boih intrastate commerce and loeal lahor 
are involved, but unless the doctrine of de minimis be 
''maximized'' to an extent far beyond that reeognized by 
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the courts, the National Board's jurisdiction attache&, 
and that jurisdiction is exclusive. Bethlehem Steel Com-
parny vs. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 
US 767 (1946), LaCrosse Telephone Company vs. Wis-
consVn Employment Relatio~JtS B.aa,rd., 336 US 18 (1948) 
and Plakinton Packing Company vs. Wisconsin Emp,loy-
ment Relations Board, 338 US 953 (19·50). 
In the Bethlehem Steel case, the issue of the federal-
state relationship was firs~t adjudicated b;y the Supreme 
Court. The issue there was whether the New York 
Board ·could certify a formen's union in an industry 
subject to the National Labor Relrutions Act where the 
National Board had refused to certify such union as 
a matter of Board policy. The Sup·reme Court held that 
certification of such union by the State Board was 
invalid as in conflict with the National Act an~d the Com-
merce Clause of the Constitution. In so holding the 
Supreme Court stated: 
"'Comp,arison of the state and federal sta-
tutes, will show that both governments have laid 
hold of the s-ame relation for regulation, and it 
involves the same employers and the same em-
ployees. Each is delegated through administrative 
authority, a wide discretion in applying this plan 
of regulation to specific cases, and they are gov-
erned by somewhat different standards. Thus, if 
both laws are upheld, two administrative bodies 
are asserting a discretionary control over the 
same subject mat~ter, conducting hearings, super-
vising elections, and determining the appropriate 
unit for bargaining in the same p·lant. * * * We 
therefore conclude, that it is beyond the power 
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of New York to apply its policies to these Appel-
lants, as attempted herein.'' 
In LaCrosse Telephone Co. vs. Wisconsin Board, 
supra, the .Supreme Court of Wisconsin had held 
that the Wisconsin Board could exercise its jurisdiction 
to determine and certify appropriate bargaining units 
until the National Board undertook to act. The Supreme 
Court of the United States rejected this view on the 
authority of the B ethelehem Steel case. 
The Plankinton Packing Co. case was one involving 
unfair labor practices, rather than certification of appro-
priate bargaining units. The Supreme Court of the 
United States, in a per curiam decision, citing the 
Bethelehem Steel and LaCrosse Telephone Comp·any 
case, held the vVisconsin Board to be without jurisdiction 
in such a rna tter. 
In Garner vs. Teamsters Union, 346 US 485, (1953) 
the Supreme Court applied the same principle to state 
courts as it had to state boards in the Bethlehem Steel 
and La1Crosse Telephone cases, and held that the Penn-
sylvania court had no jurisdiction to enjoin picketing 
practices which were in viola ton of both state and federal 
law. The Supreme Court said: 
''Congress did not merely lay down a sub-
stantive rule of law to be enforced by any tribunal 
competent to apply law generally to the parties. 
It went on to provide primary interpretation and 
application of its rules to a specific and specially 
constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular 
procedure for investigation, complaint, notice and 
hearing thereon, including judicial relief, pending 
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a final administrative order. Congress evidently 
considered that centralized administration of 
specially designated procedures was necessary to 
obtain uniform application of its substantive rules 
and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely 
to result from a variety of local procedures and 
attitudes toward local controversies. * * * 
A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of 
procedure are quite as apt to produee incompati-
ble or conflicting adjudication, as are different 
rules of substantive law. The sa.m.e re.asoiiJ'I)ing that 
prohibit Federal ·Courts from intervenin.g in 
swch oases, exc-ept by way of review, or by .apvp~lica­
tion of the Fe.derril Board, precludes state courts 
from doing so. [citing c:ase.s] And the reasons for 
excluding state administrative bodies from assum-
ing control of matters exp·ressly placed w·ithin the 
confines of the Federal Board, also exclud-e state 
courts from like action.'' (emphasis supplied.) 
The rule established by the Supreme Court of the 
United States has 'been aptly summarized by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in Pittsburg Railw~ays vs. Di-
vision 85, Amalg.amated Association of Street Railw:ay 
Emp-loyees of America, 357 Pa. 379, 54 At. 2d 891, 174 
ALR 1045: 
''The clear implication of the decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Bethele-
hem Steel vs. New York State Labor Relations 
Board, 330 US 767, is that wherever the employer-
employee relationship is on·e over which Congress 
has power of regulation and with regard to which 
Congress has acted, state power is suspended 
and cannot constitutionally be exercised. * * * The 
·criterion to ·determine the validity of the exercise 
of state power is not whether the agency admini-
10 
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stering federal law has acted upon the relation .. 
ship in a given case; rather it is whether Congress 
has asserted its power to regulate that relation-
ship." 
The question of the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
National Board, being so clearly established by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, which has the final 
word on this question, the only issue remaining in the 
case at bar concerning the invalidity of the Utah Board's 
order in this matter, is whether in any way the action 
of the National Board in declining to exercise its juris-
diction to consider the unfair labor practice charge con-
veys any jurisdiction to the Utah State Board. It is 
the position of Photo Sound that it does not. 
POINT TWO 
ACTION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD IN DECLINING TO EXERCISE ITS JURISDICTION 
DOES NOT CONVEY JURISDICTION TO THE UTAH 
BOARD. 
A. Th'e National Labor aelations Board has not ceded 
jurisdiction. 
Section 10 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act 
as amended in 1947 provides: 
''The Board is empowered, as hereinafter 
provided, to prevent any person from engaging 
in any unfair labor practice affecting commerce. 
This power shall not be affe·cted by any other 
means of adjustment or prevention that has been 
or may be established by agreement, law, or other-
wise; Provided, That the Board is empowered by 
agreement with any agency of any State or Ter-
ritory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any 
cases in any industry (other than mining, manu-
11 
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facturing, communications, and transportation 
except where predominantly local in character) 
even though su·ch cases may involve labor disputes 
affe:cting commerce, unless the provision of the 
State or Territorial statute applicable to the de-
termination of such cases by such agency is incon-
sistent with the corresponding provision of this 
Act or has received a construction inconsistent 
therewith. '' 
There is no contention here that the National Board 
has entered into an agreement with the Utah Board to 
cede its jurisdiction. In the La'Crosse Telephone case, 
the Supreme c·ourt referred to this provision and stated: 
"The result we have reached is not changed 
by the Labor Management Rel·ations Act of 1947. 
That .A!ct grants the National Board authority, 
un·der specified conditions, to cede its jurisdiction 
to a state agency, but it does not appear that there 
has been any cession of jurisdiction to Wisconsin 
by the National Board in any representation pro-
ceeding.'' 
The New York eourt, in New York State Labor Re-
lations Board vs. Wags Transp:artation Comp·any, 130 
N.Y. Supp. 2d 731 makes clear that section lO(a) defines 
the only procedure for ceding of federal jurisdiction to 
a state board. The court there said : 
''In adopting the proviso of section 10( a), 
the clear policy of Congress was to prevent the 
application of state law and p·rocedure which did 
not conform to the Taft-Hartley Act. Congress 
was not unaware of the early practice of ceding 
practice· to loeal boards. Indeed, it considered the 
method desirable, but limitations were placed 
up·on su'Ch ·cession. App·arently, Congress decided 
12 
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it was more important to have no cession than to 
have it without complying with the standard pre-
scribed. A secondary purpose may well have been 
to encourage state legislation to adopt the Taft-
Hartley provisions. * * * 
''It follows quite logically that Congress pro-
vided in seetion 10 (a) the sole means of trans-
ferring to state jurisdiction activities which are 
subject to the National Labor Relations Act as 
ainended. * * * 
"It is important that since the Bethlehem 
decision, Congress enacted the proviso to section 
10(ia) which prescribes the exclusive means for 
transferring the jurisdiction of the National 
Board to a state agency. 
''This case involves a company subject to 
the National Act and Board. The substantive 
unfair labor practices are the same under federal 
and state .acts. 
"It only remains to decide whether the re-
strictive proviso on cession ·c'Omes within the gen-
eneral rule stated in the Bethlehem case, that 
state action is pre·cluded 'if it is clear that Con-
gress has intended no regulation except its own.' 
"Section lO(a) does prohibit cession except 
on specified terms. The fact that there are limited 
exceptions does not vitiate the power of Congress 
to prevent state action. Indeed, the proviso with-
drew from the National Board the authority it 
had exercised prior to 194 7 to cede jurisdiction on 
its own terms. 
''The Respondent correctly argues, in effect, 
that the National Board cannot do by abdication 
what it cannot do by agreement.'' 
13 
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See also A. E. Nettleton Co. vs. United ShoeJnaket·s 
of America, 010, 28 Labor Cases, para. 69,211 (N.Y. 
March, 1955). . 
This position has been recognized by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, another jurisdiction where the state-
federal jurisdictional question over labor relations has 
been litigated numerous times. In 'Wisconsin Ernp~loy­
ment Relations Board vs. Cha;uffeurs, Team.sters, etc., 
66 N.W. 2d 218 (1954) an unfair labor practice charge 
had been filed with the Wisconsin Board by the company 
against the union. The union filed an answer alleging 
that under the National Act its activities were regulated 
by and subject to the 'exclusive jurisdiction of the Na-
tional Board. The State Board made findings and con-
clusions to the effect that the picketing was in violation 
of Wisconsin statutes and filed a petition for enforce-
ment of its order in the Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County. A temporary restraining order was issued by 
that court and subsequently that court entered a judg-
ment enforcing the court or·der. The matter was th·en 
appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court where the 
decision of the lower court and of the State Board 
was reversed. The Wisconsin Court made it clear that 
where activity of a labor union in picketing to coerce 
an employer to interfere with an employee's rights to 
refrain from joining or .assisting a labor union consti-
tutes an unfair labor practice under both the National 
Act and the State Act, the National Board has exclusive 
jurisdiction and a state board or court may not act 
in such .a case. It held that where the unfair labor prac-
14 
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tice eomplained of was unla-\vful under both the state 
and the national acts a state hoard or court could 
have jurisdiction only if the state statute was similar 
to the Nati'Onal Act and the National Board had ceded 
its jurisdiction to the state agency under the provisions 
of Section lO(a) of the National Act. The Wisconsin 
Court said: 
''If the laws are analagous the only result 
is that in its discretion the National Board may 
cede jurisdiction to the state. Section 10( a) of the 
Act, as amended, makes it clear that the state does 
not have jurisdiction of this type of case in its own 
right." (emphasis supplied.) 
T·o the same effect is a decision of the Pennsyl-
vania Court of Common Pleas in Ad,elphia Cons. Co. 
vs. Building .and Con. Trades Council of Philadelphia, 27 
Labor Cases, par. 68,843 (Penn., 1954). 
Inasmuch as there is nothing in the record indicating 
a cession by the National Board to the Utah State Board 
of jurisdiction over Photo Sound, the only question is, 
could the state board, by the mere fact of the refusal of 
the National Board to exercise its jurisdiction, obtain 
jurisdiction~ 
B. The refusal of the National Labor Relations Board 
to exercise its jurisdiction, does not create jurisdiction in 
the State Board. 
Under the authorities cited and quoted above, it is 
incontravertible that the National Board would and does 
have jurisdiction in this matter. The only ne;w fact in 
the case is that the National Board, midway in its handl-
ing of the labor relations of Photo Sound, for budgetary 
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or other reasons, best known to the board, changed its 
policy and declined to exercise its jurisdiction in this and 
other cas.es involving businesses the size and nature of 
Photo Soun·d. It has not, by the adoption of these ne'v 
standards or "yardsticks," held that it no longer has 
jurisdiction. 
Similar yardsticks in the exercise of its discretion 
to take jurisdiction were first announced by the National 
Board in October, 1950. In a press release dated October 
5, 1950, the Board announced: 
''The time has come when experienee war-
rants the establishment and announce:ment of cer-
tain standards which will better clarify and define 
where the difficult line can best be drawn. 
''The Board has long been of the opinion that 
it would better effectuate the purposes of the 
act and promote the prompt handling of major 
cases, not to exercise its jurisdiction to the fullest 
possible extent under the authority delegated to 
it by C ong·ress, but to limit that exercise to enter-
prises whose operations have, or at which labor 
disputes woul~d have, a pronounced impact upon 
the flow of interstate com.meree. This policy 
should in our opinion be mamtained. 
''The Board thereby reiterated its policy of 
not exercising jurisdiction despite its power to do 
so, over businesses so local in character that a 
sufficient impact upon interstate commerce to 
justify an already burdened Federal Board ~n 
expevnding tim.e, energy amd public {11.1YlAds." 
(emphasis supplied.) 
The right of the National Board to use diseretion 
in determining whether to exercise its jurisdiction under 
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such yardsticks has heen upheld, Haleston Drug Stores 
vs. NLRB, 187 Fed. 2d, 418, (CA 9, 19•51), and has been 
recognized in a left-handed way by the Supreme Court 
of the United States in NLRB vs. Building and Constrvuc-
tion Tr.ad.es C ou.ncil, 341 U;S. 675, ( 19·51) where it said: 
''Even when the effect of the activities on 
interstate commerce is sufficient to enable the 
Board to take jurisdiction of a company, the Board 
'Sometimes properly declines to do so, stating 
that the policy of the Act would not be effectuated 
by its assertion of jurisdiction in that case." 
In 1954, effective July 1 and July 15 of that year, 
the National Board made an announcement of a revision 
of its yardsticks which affected its discretion to exercise 
its jurisdiction. In that press release the Board stated: 
"The National Labor Relations Board today 
announced seven changes in its standards for 
determining whether the Board will take jurisdic-
tion of a case. The earlier standards were adopted 
in October, 1950. The Board has discretion in 
which cases of those affecting interstate com-
merce it will exercise jurisdiction." 
It was only arter this latest revision of its yardsticks that 
the National Board declined to assert its jurisdiction over 
the unfair labor practice charges filed with it by the 
CIO aganst Photo Sound. 
The true nature of this exercise of discretion not 
to act was made clear by the First Circuit in NLRB vs. 
Star Beef Company, 193 Fed. 2d 8 (1951). In that case 
the employer contended that because the Board had de-
clined to assert jurisdiction in the past, it could not now 
do so in the application of a different administrative 
policy. The eourt said: 
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''The simple answer to this is that the Board 
has jurisdiction all the time. National Labor Re-
lations Board vs. Jones and Laughlin, 301 U.S. 
1. The Board's exercise of discretion here does 
not enlarge or exceed its jurisdiction so as to 
prejudice this respondent, since the acts com-
plained of, if proved, would violate the act and 
redress can be procured under it.'' 
The history of the l(inard case (Buildilng Trades 
Cowncil vs. Kilnard, 346 U.S. 933 (1954)) indicates the 
foregoing analysis is correct. In the Alabama State 
Court, the plaintiff was seeking an injunction contending 
that the National Board had indicated that under its 1950 
jurisdictional standards it would decline to assert juris-
diction and that therefore, the doctrine which became 
fixed by the Garner case would not apply. The Alabama 
Supreme Court agreed, stating in Kinard Construction 
vs. Building Trades Council, 64 So. 2d 400, that the right 
of the plain tiff to an injunction is con trolled by the 
question of whether the labor union was shown to have 
committed an unfair labor practice under the Act and 
its effect on commerce is within the limits set by the 
Board for the exercise of its jurisdiction. The Supreme 
C'ourt of the United States reversed (Building Trades 
Council vs. Kinard, supra). 
The Supreme Court of the United States applied 
the same approach in the Bethlehem Steel case when it 
denied the right of the state board to act. Bethlehem 
Steel vs. New York State Labor Relations Bo.ard, supra, 
stating: 
"It is clear that the failure of the National 
Labor Relations Board to entertain foremen's 
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petitions was of the latter class. [where failure 
of federal officials affirmatively to exercise their 
full authority takes on the character of a ruling 
that no such regulation is appropriate or ap-
proved pursuant to the policy of the statute] 
There was no administrative concession that the 
nature of these appellants' business put their em-
ployees beyond reach of federal authority. The 
Board several times entertained similar proceed-
ings by other employees whose right rested on the 
same words of Congress. Neither did the National 
Board ever deny its own jurisdiction over peti-
tions because they were by foremen. Re Soss Mfg. 
Co. 56 NLRB(F) 348. It made clear that its re-
fusal to designate foremen's bargaining umits w·as 
a determination and an exercise of its d'iscretion 
to determine that such units we.re not ap'propriate 
for bargaining purposes. Re Maryland Drydock 
Co. 49 NLRB(F) 733. We cannot, therefore, deal 
,vith this as a case where F·ederal power has been 
delegated but lies dormant and unexercised. 
(emphasis supplied.) 
Congress was not unaware of this approach of the 
Supreme Court when it passed the Taft-Hartley Act. 
See H.R. Rep. No. 235 on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. 1st 
Sess. p. 44. As pointed out by the Supreme Court itself 
in Amalgamated Association of Street, Ele~ctric and Rail-
way Employees vs. WERE, 340 US 383 (1951): 
'' * * * The legislative history of the 194 7 Act 
refers to the decision of this Court in Bethlehem 
Steel Co. vs. N·ew York Labor Board, 330 U.S. 
767 (1947), and~ in its handling of the problems 
presented by that case, Congress demonstrated 
that it knew how to cede jurisdiction to the states. 
Congress k:new full well that its labor legislation 
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'preempts the field that the act covers insofar as 
commerce within the meaning of the act is eon-
cerned' and demonstrated its ability to spell out 
with particularity those areas in which it desired 
state regulation to be operative." 
There are two areas left to state control. One is the 
area whieh is not governed by Federal legislation. See 
Allen-Br,adley Local vs. Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942), .Auto 
Workers vs. Wis. Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949) and .Algoma 
Plywood Co., vs. Wis. Board, 336 U.S. 301 (1949). The 
other area is where Congress has preserved the right of 
state action in the face of Federal legislation which 
would otherwise exclude it. See for example, Sec. 14(b) 
of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 author-
izing the so-called "right to work" legislation. 
Apparently, it was the decision of Congress to meet 
the possibilities of a jurisdictional hiatus raised by the 
Bethlehem Steel Comp,an;y ease, by authorizing the Na-
tional Board to cede jurisdiction in certain circumstances 
to the state boards. 
A statement of the Supreme Court confirms this inter-
pretation of section 10(a). It was said in the Algoma 
Plywood Go. vs. Wis. Board case, supra, at 313, that the 
purpose of the amendment of section 10(a) in the 1947 
Act to insert the p,roviso giving the· National Labor Re-
lations Board the power to make cession agreements was: 
'' ... to meet situations made possible by the 
Bethlehem case where no state agency would be 
free to take jurisdiction of cases over whieh the 
N·ational Board has declined jurisdiction.'' 
However. its desire to secure uniformity established as 
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a condition precedent the requirement that the state 
law be similar to the Taft-Hartley Act. The fact that 
neither Utah nor any other state has seen fit to amend 
its state law to conform to the National Act and thus 
become eligible for cession of authority from the National 
Board does not give the Utah State Board the right to 
act contrary to the express provisions of the Congres--
sional Act. If the Utah Legislature deems the no-man's 
land created by the application of the Congres,sional rules 
and the decisions of the Supreme Court to be an unfor-
tunate one, it need only amend the Utah Act to make 
the Utah Board eligible for delegation of authority from 
the National Board. 
The principle involved in the case at bar should be 
clearly distinguishable from the issue which troubled 
this court in Utah Labor Relations Board vs. Utah Valley 
Hospital, 235 P. 2d 520 (1951) and the Circuit Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Utah Valley Hospital 
vs. Utah Labor Relations Board, 199 Fed. 2d 6 (1952). 
In the Hos·pital case Congress had taken away the juris-
diction of the National Board over charitable hospitals. 
Of course, that left the Utah Board free to act. Here, 
however, it is not ·c,ongress, but the National Board in 
its transitory use of its discretion, that denies to the 
union the facilities of the National Act. 
In two recent state cases this distinction has been 
made clear. In both the state courts recognized that until 
Congress acted, the use of the National Board's discre-
tion in not exercising its jurisdiction would not create 
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any jurisdiction in the state. New York State Labor 
Relations Boa.rd vs. ·wags Transportation System, supra, 
Universal Car d!; Service Co. vs. lAM, (Michigan, 1954) 
27 CCH Labor Cases, par. 68,825. 
Finally, the latest and most authoritative decision 
on this federal question is the very recent decision of the 
Court of A·ppeals for the T·enth ·Circuit (Ret.ail Clerks 
Local1564 AFL vs. Your Food Stores of S(JJYI;·t~a Fe, Inc. 
(;CA 10, August 4, 19~5'5), 28 c:c·H Labor Cases, par. 
69,4t5'). 
In that case, an action for an injunction against un-
lawful picketing was filed in the state court. The matter 
was then removed to the New Mexico Federal District 
Court where a motion to dismiss and to dissolve the 
temporary restraining order was granted1 under au-
thority of the Garner and Amazon cases. Thi's judgment 
was never appealed and no motion to remand to the 
state court was ever filed. In July of 1954, some seven 
weeks after entering of the judgment in that case the Re-
gional Director of the NLRB advised both parties by 
letter that the Store's interstate operations did not ap-
p,ear to meet any of the n:ewly announced ''standards for 
the assertion of jurisdiction'' anrd that the director was 
therefore refusing to issue a complaint against the Store 
in response to the union's charges. Thereafter the union 
resumed its peaceful picketing and the store again insti-
tuted an action in the state court and obtained another 
temp.orary injunction. The union then instituted an 
action in the F·ederal District Court to stay the injunc-
1 Your Food Stores vs. Retail Clerks, 121 F. Supp. 339 (1954) 
2Am-azon Cotton Mills Co. vs. Textile Union, 167 Fed. 2 183 
(CA 4 1948) 
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t :on issued by the state court. The trial court refused 
to interfere with the state court injunction under its 
interpretation of the Federal Judicial Code. 3 On appeal 
the Circuit Court reversed, stating with respect to the 
point pertinent to the case at bar: 
''Moreover, the refusal by the NLRB to 
entertain the instant grievance on its merits did 
not of itself alter the pertinent law thereby re-
vesting the state court with authority to proceed. 
Amended Section lO(a) of the Act specifically 
provides what this Court deems to be the only 
"\vay state authorities can be vested with authority 
now within the exclusive purview of the Act. 
Unless and until there is an express ceding of 
jurisdiction to a proper state agency exclusive 
jurisd,iction remains in the fede~al agency. For 
sake of order such must be true. Otherwise, an 
interminable problem of determining jurisdiction 
would exist, throwing needless confusion into an 
area clearly preempted by Congress.'' (emphasis 
supplied.) 
This leaves only the argument advanced by the union 
before the Utah State Board, in its brief filed in response 
to the request of the hearing examiner, that the effect 
of this ruling is to leave a void in which the National 
Board refuses to act and the State Board has no power 
to act. The Circuit Court answered this argument by 
inserting as a footnote, the following quotation from 
the Universal Car Co. case, supra: 
"If the jurisdiction of the state courts is to 
depend-not upon the act of Congress and the 
actual jurisdiction of the NLRB-but upon the 
8 124 F. Supp. 697 (1954) 
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day-to-day or month-to-month discretionary exer-
cise of jurisdiction by the Board, dependent upon 
changing budgetary conditions or upon its eco-
nomic, social or political views at the moment, 
then neither the courts nor the litigants can know 
with any certainty where jurisdiction lies, nor 
whether in a given case jurisdiction existing at 
the time of its commencement will continue until 
its final decision." 
In short, the argument as to the wisdom of the vesting 
by Congress of the exclusive jurisdiction with the N a-
tiona! Board and the choice of the National Board not 
to exercise such jurisdiction involves neither this court 
nor the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Such 
argument should he addressed to Congress. 
This point is summarized very well in an article in 
the January, 19'55 is-sue of Labor Law Journal, at page 
3 entitled "NLRB Jurisdictional Policies and the Fed-
eral-State Relationship'' by Fred Witney, professor of 
economics at the University of Indiana. The author 
states: 
' 'In the exercise of its judicial function, the 
Supreme Court must take federal legislation as 
enacted. With res·pect to the p~roblem of federal-
state jurisdiction, the Court must he governed by 
the express provisions of the national law. As 
demonstrated, Congress spelled out in detail those 
areas of lahor relations over which it desired 
the states to exercise concurrent jurisdiction with 
the federal government. Congress likewise estab-
lished a limited scheme whereby the N.L.R.B. 
could cede jurisdiction to the states. It is sub-
mitte·d that the Supreme Court would rea·d much 
more into Section lO(a) of the federal law than 
actually exists if it holds that mere contraction of 
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jurisdiction by the N.L.R.B. permits state activity 
within interstate co1nmerce. If the N.L.R.B. has 
created mischief by establishing a 'no-man's land' 
in industrial relations, it is not within the power 
of the Supreme Court to correct this state of 
affairs by a decision which would be inconsistent 
with the national law. 
''In the last analysis, it is the Congress and 
not the N.L.R.B. which determines fundamental 
national labor policy. It would appear that 'the 
criterion to determine validity of the exercise of 
state power is not vvhether the agency administer-
ing federal law has acted upon the relationship in 
a given case; rather, it is whether Congress has 
asserted its power to regulate that relationship.' 
Congress, and not the ambivalent policies of an 
administrative agency, determines the point at 
which states may operate in an area reserved to 
the federal government by the Constitution of the 
United States. It might have been unwise for 
the national lawmakers to establish a procedure 
so strict and limited in character that it precludes 
federal cession or jurisdiction to state control. 
But the Supreme Court must be controlled by the 
provisions of national law passed pursuant to the 
Constitution, regardless of its merits or wisdom.' H 
Congress has, in fact, given consideration to the 
problem. Attempts to release the strict conditions which 
limit the freedom of the National I_jabor Relations Board 
to eede jurisdiction under section 10 (a) were made at the 
1 See alrso 67 Harvard Law Review, 1297 "Federalism in 
the Law of Labor Relations" by Archibald Cox, June, 1954, and 
43 Georgetown Law Review, 67, (1954), "No Man's Land in 
Labor Relations-A Survey." For an article attacking the Wls-
dom of the Board's policy see "NLRB Absolutism, a Dogma Re-
visited" Labor Law Journal, May, 1955, p. 279, by Roche and 
Henslowe. See also Hay "Federalism and Labor Relations in 
the United States" 102 Pennsylvania Law Review 959. 
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2nd session of the 83rd Congress. The Senate Labor 
Committee, acting upon the recommendation of Presi-
dent Eisenhower, embodied the following provision in a 
proposed bill to amend the Taft-Hartley law. 
" Sec. 6 (b) ( 1) The Board, in its discretion, 
may decline to assert jurisdiction over any lahor 
dispute where, in the opinion of the Board, the 
effect on commerce is not sufficiently substantial 
to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction. (2) 
Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prevent or 
bar any agency, or the courts of any State or 
Territory, from assuming and asserting jurisdic-
tion over labor disputes over which the Board de-
clines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsec-
tion, to assert jurisdiction.'' 
(See Sen. Rep. No. 11211 on S.B. 2650, 83rd 
Cong. 2d s.ess. 28 (19154) ). 
Such a provision would answer the problem raised in 
the case at ·bar. While this proposal has, up to now, 
shared the same fate as other Taft-Hartley amendments, 
it is submitted that such Congressional action is the 
only answer. This court can do no more than apply the 
law as it exists. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons it is submitted that the 
Utah Labor Relations Board has no jurisdiction in the 
case at bar and that its order directed against Photo 
Sound should he reversed on that ground. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Peter W. Billings 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT & 
MABEY 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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